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Fatal Assumption
A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental
Disability Cases
Michael L. Perlin*

This article questions the a,ssumption that mentally disabled individuals are regularly afforded competent counsel. It finds that such counsel is frequently not available and that our failure to challenge
this assumption threatens to make illusory reform efforts by lawyers and mental health professionals
alike. The presence of vigorous, independent counsel is critical, especially since legal rights are not
self-executing. Such counsel serves an educative function in the entire process, seeks to assure the
implementation of collateral legal rights, and avoids the "underidentification" of mental disability
cases. These functions have become more important as the political and social climate has changed
and as the subject matter has become more complex. A series of reform recommendations is offered
· to litigators, policy makers, judges, and legislators.

One of the basic maxims of trial practice is the prohibition against assuming a fact
not in evidence. Lawyers cannot ask a question on cross-examination that assumes such a fact ("Have you stopped beating your spouse?" is the most notorious example) nor can they assume such a fact either in framing a hypothetical or
in a summation. A similar proscription bars judges from assuming such facts as
predicates to their application of law in their opinions. There is nothing contro* The author wishes to acknowledge Debbie Dorfman for her research help, David Wexler, Ingo
Keilitz, Bob Sadoff, and Joel Dvoskin for their helpful comments and encouragement, and Eric
Janus, Bob Dinerstein, and Natalie Reatig for their helpful and patient explanations about (respectively) the Minnesota and Virginia commitment systems and the federal Protection and Advocacy
Act. This article is adapted from remarks made at the Symposium on Mental Health and Justice
Systems Interactions, sponsored by the National Center for State Courts, Arlington, VA, November
1990. Reprint requests should be addressed to Professor Perlin, New York Law School, 57 Worth
St., New York, NY 10013.
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versial about these rules; they have always governed litigation practice and procedure.1
,
Yet, much of the discourse of the past several years dealing with all aspects
of mental disability law assumes a major fact nowhere in evidence: that mentally
disabled individuals are regularly afforded competent counsel to represent them in
the whole array of litigation, counseling, negotiating, and advocacy services in
which counsel is expected to play an important role. 2 The general acceptance of
this illusion has seemingly lulled us into a corollary set of assumptions- about
commitment law, institutional rights law, the impact of mental disability on the
criminal trial process, and the legal rights of the formerly institutionalized-that
has seriously, perhaps fatally, affected the way we view these underlying substantive and procedural legal issues.
The growth and development of mental disability law over the past two
decades has been analyzed through many different filters. Variously, it is seen as
(a) an outgrowth of the "civil rights revolution" (through which patients and
expatients replicated the experiences of other disenfranchised and marginalized
individuals)3 ; (b) a result of changes in funding mechanisms (in which the existence of financial incentives to reduce patient population-never complemented
by parallel means of providing adequate program funding in community Iocations4-helped create a universe in which tightened substantive commitment standards and more elaborate procedural due process protections at commitment
1

See e.g. , D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 334, at 415-16 (1979); Myers, The Child
Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 Pac. L.J.
801, 857 (1987) (basic maxim); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935); Mcintyre v. State,
1990 WL 124141 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), at I (bar on cross-examination); See e.g., Stockwell v.
Stockwell, 116 Idaho 297, 301, 775 P. 2d 611, 615 (1989) (Johnson, J., concurring); State v. Apostle,
8 Conn. App. 216, 512 A. 2d 947, 956 (1986) (spouse-beating question); Thomas v. Myers, 655 S.W.
2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Pippin v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 799 S.W. 2d 898, 903 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990) (bar on use in hypothetical); Crosslin v. State, 489 So. 2d 680,683-84 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986)
(bar on use on summation). Justice Scalia's opinion in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221 (1987), is criticized for such assumptions in Sobel, First Amendment Standards For
Government Subsidies ofArtistic and Cultural Expression: A Reply to Justices Scalia and Rehnquist,
41 Vand. L. Rev. 517, 523 (1988).
2
For the classic statement of this position, see Stone, The Myth of Advocacy, 30 Hosp. & Commun.
Psychiat. 819, 820-22 (1979); see also, Reinert, A Living Will for a Commitment Hearing, 31 Hosp.
& Commun. Psychiat. 857 (1980); compare Perlin, Psychiatric Hospitalization: Some Predictions for
the 80's, in Critical Issues in American Psychiatry and the Law 239, 260-61 (R. Rosner ed. 1982), and
Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Patient Advocate, 54 Psychiat. Q. 169, 173 (1982) (criticizing
Stone). As I discuss below, this assumption is shared by key Congressional leaders, see infra note
91, and federal judges, see infra note 59. Paradoxically, ·overaggressive advocacy on the part of
patients' lawyers has recently become the target of severe criticisms by psychiatrists, elected political officials, and others, who focus blame on such advocacy efforts as a primary cause of homelessness among deinstitutionalized patients. See generally, Perlin, Book Review of A. B. Johnson,
Out of Bedlam: The Truth About Deinstitutionalization, 8 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 557 (1991); see
also infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
3
See Perlin, Rights ofEx-Patients in the Community: The Next Frontier? 8 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiat.
& L. 33, 34 (1980).
4
See E. F. Torrey, Nowhere to Go; The Tragic Odyssey of the Homeless Mentally Ill25-29, 112-18
(1988).
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stated-is that vigorous (perhaps overvigorous) counsel is readily available. 10 This
incorrect assumption has helped create a mirage that has effectively taken off the
agenda what is perhaps the most important remaining substantive question of
mental disability law: Do the institutionalized mentally disabled (or those formerly
institutionalized or in danger of institutionalization) have access to adequate,
structured counsel? 11 Resolution of this question leads inexorably to the next level
inquiry: If such counsel is not available, what impact does that have on the future
of both mental disability law and the lives of the population in question?
While there has been some episodic evidence of bar development, while some
jurisdictions have developed statewide or locality-wide specialized advocacy services, while the implementation of the Protection and Advocacy For the Mentally
Ill Act (P&A Act) has ensured the availability of some legal counsel in every state,
and while the importance of counsel is-finally-being appreciated, 12 the overall
picture is little better than it was in 1978 when the initial recommendation of
President Carter's Commission on Mental Health's Task Force on Legal and
Ethical Issues was the passage of legislation "which would establish and adequately finance a system of comprehensive advocacy services for mentally handicapped persons." 13 And, because the assumption that some kind of counsel is
now available has transformed the topic into a nonissue, it is more essential than
ever that we confront the underlying reality: It is little more than an illusion that
the l<igal system is responsive to the litigational and representational needs of
mentally disabled individuals. Such individuals remain systematically underrepresented in all matters related to their disability. 14
In Part I, I will restate the historical critique of the role of counsel in cases
involving mentally disabled persons and will briefly sketch out the varying models
of appointed counsel available in such cases. 15 In Part II, I will develop my thesis
that our failure to address this question threatens to render illusory all of the law
reform efforts, social and political developments, and "rights talk" that have
the fulfillment of such obligations. For the few cases where states have challenged orders that
allegedly obliged a hospital to confine a patient inappropriately, see Wexler, supra note 5, at 200.
10
See e.g., E. F. Torrey, supra note 4, at 156-59; Lamb, Deinstitutiona/ization ·and the Homeless
Mentally Jll, 35 Hosp. & Commun. Psychiat. 899, 902 (1984) (criticizing patients' rights lawyers as
a major force behind inappropriate deinstitutionalization and resulting homelessness). I consider
this critique carefully in Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization and Homelessness: A Story of
Marginalization, 28 Hou. L. Rev. 63, 86-88 (1991).
11 On the different models of "organized" and "regularized" counsel, see 2M. Perlin, supra note 5,
§§8.06-8.10.
12
Early bar demonstration projects are discussed in 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8. 10, at 78-4!2, see·also
id. at §8.08 (discussing New Jersey and New York programs in detail); id. at 8.16 (discussing 42
U.S.C. §10801 et seq. (Pamphlet 1988) (P&A Act)).
13
Mental Health and Human Rights: Report on the Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, 20 Ariz.
L. Rev. 49, 54 (1978) (Task Panel Report).
14
See Herr, supra note 6, at 377. Although the Supreme Court has never found that. there is a
constitutional right to counsel in involuntary civil commitment cases, other case law is virtually
unanimous in such a finding. See 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, Comment to §8.06, at 755.
1
~ See infra text accompanying notes 19-37.
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emerged as standard discourse in this area over the past two decades, 16 and will
explain why this is so important, focusing particularly on the dilemma that this
creates in a system such as ours in which rights are not self-executing and on the
consequential "real world" implications of such a system. 17 In Part Ill, I will
conclude and offer some modest suggestions for reform. 18

I. PROVISION OF COUNSEL TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED
The record of the legal profession in providing meaningful advocacy services
to mentally disabled persons has been grossly inadequate. 19 Before the early
1970s, court hearings were infrequently required prior to the ordering of involuntary civil commitment,20 counsel was rarely provided, and courts regularly defaulted in their decision-makin~ responsibilities. 2 1 The historical critique was
unanimous:
Traditional, sporadically-appointed counsel .. . were unwilling to pursue necessary investigations, lacked ... expertise in dealing with mental health problems, and suffered
from "rolelessness," stemming from near total capitulation to experts, hazily defined
concepts of success/failure, inability to generate professional or personal interest in the
patient's dilemma, and lack of a clear definition of the proper advocacy function . As a
result, counsel ... functioned "as no more than a clerk, ratifying the events that transpired, rather than influencing them. " 22

Commitment hearings were little more than a ritual, adding only a "falsely
reassuring patina of respectability to the proceedings.' m In one case study, counsel was so inadequate that a patient's chance for release was actually greater if
there was no lawyer present. 24 On the other hand, when active counsel was
involved, such lawyers played a critical role in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings. 25 Studies of jurisdictions where such lawyers were available re16

See infra text accompanying notes 38-48.
See infra text accompanying notes 49-117.
18
See infra text accompanying notes 118-21.
19
Much of the text that accompanies notes 2~37, infra, is adapted from 2M. Perlin, supra note 5,
Chapte~ 8. On the question of inadequacy of counsel, see generally , Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Issues
in the Representation of Indi~iduals in (he Commitment Process, 45 Law & Contemp. Probs. 161
(Summer 1982).
20
This section will deal mainly with the availability of counsel as the involuntary civil commitment
hearings. On the question of the right to counsel in matters beyond commitment and release, see 2
M. Perlin, supra. note 5, §8.35.
.
21
See Hiday, The Attorney's Role in In voluntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 1027, 1030
(1982).
.
22
Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 164 (footnotes omitted):
23
Hiday, supra note 21, at 1030, quoting Andalman & Chambers·; Effective Counsel for Persons
Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey , a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 72 (1974).
24
Andalman & Chambers, supra note 23, at 72.
2
s For early surveys, see e.g., Kumasaka & Stokes, Involuntary Hospitalization: Opinions and Attitudes of Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 13 Compreh. Psychiat. 201 (1972); Silverberg, The Civil Com17
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fleeted the significance of "regularized, organized systems[s] of legal service
delivery ... staffed with full-time advocates whose sole job it is to provide legal
representation to the handicapped. " 26
While there is now some sort of provision in each jurisdiction for the provision of counsel to individuals facing commitment,27 these. systems vary widely in
their comprehensiveness, in the depth of their mandate, in their commitment to
specialization, and in their levels of payment. 28 As a result, the quality of the
representation is uneven, varying both from state to state and within states. 29
While scholars and critics are virtually unanimous that aqvocacy services to the
mentally disabled should be provided through organized regular mechanisms30
(such as the New York Mental Hygiene Legal Service, the New Jersey Division
of Mental Health Advocacy, or the Ohio Legal Rights Advisors),31 the ~ast majority of lawyers who represent the disabled on individual matters are appointed
on individual basesY Such appointments almost never measure up to the appropriate ethical or constitutional standards for such representation33 ; while there is
mitment Process: Basic Considerations, in I Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped 103, 109
(B. J. Ennis & P. Friedman, eds. 1973).
26 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 173.
27 See Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally ll/, 82 W.Va. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1979). A taxonomy for these provisions is suggested in 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.06, at 756-58.
28 The different programs are described in id., 8.07.
29 See id. , §§8. 17-19; Zander, supra n~te 5 (discussing county-by-county variance in Wisconsin).
30 Andalman & Chambers, supra note 23, at 75-79; Durham & LaFond, The Empirical Consequences
and Policy implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 Yale Law &
Pol'y Rev. 395, 425-28, 439-43 (1985); see also, Task Panel Report, supra note 13, at 56:
An essential feature of ... advocacy systems should be their effort to provide a continuity of legal services to [mentally disabled) persons at all stages of their contact with the
mental disability system .... In addition to attorneys (an "indispensable element in
seeking and securing many types of remedies"), the advocacy system should be staffed
by persons trained as "mental health professionals" . .. , lay advocates, present' and
former recipients of mental health services, so as to provide a full-time staff with the
necessary academic training and practical experience to provide full advocacy serviced
for its clientele.
(footnotes omitted).
See N.Y. Ment. Hyg. L. §47.03 (McKinney 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. §52:27E-23 et seq. (West Supp.
1985); Ohio Stat. Ann. §51.23.60 (1990). The New York system is discussed in Gupta, N ew York's
Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 405, 448
(1971); the New Jersey system in Heffner, Legislative Oversight: An Analysis of L. I974, Chapter
25, Department of the Public Advocate Act, I Seton Hall Legis. J. 75, 80-81 (Summer 1976).
32 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.11, at 783-84.
33 For an early study, see Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 424 (1966) .. On the broader question of the duties of lawyers representing
putatively incompetent clients, see Margulies, "Who Are You To Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client
Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonc/ients, 68 N .C. L. Rev. 213, 225
n. 83 (1990); Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Legal Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515,517-21. To a significant extent, this inadequate job
may reflect the less-than-vigorous quality of representation implicitly or explicitly favored by a •
significant number of trial judges assigned to such cases. Experienced lawyers confirm that attempts
at vigorous cross-examination and at the development of novel defenses are frequently rebuffedangrily-by trial judges assigned to civil commitment dockets. (Personal communication, Professor
31
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some reported recent improvement in this area, full-time, structured counsel is
inevitably more effective. 34 Also, while prestigious commissions and expert commentators have called on the private bar to commit greater resources and efforts
to this area (both by providing representation and training), little has yet been
done. 35 Notwithstanding the major contributions of a handful of lawyers in private
practice who have devoted their careers almost exclusively to the representation
of the handicapped, 36 there is little reason to be optimistic about the likelihood of
universal invigorated private representation of this population in the near future.

II. THE ILLUSION OF LEGAL RIGHTS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF COUNSEL
A. The Rights Illusion
As long as mentally disabled individuals are not assured of access to adequate, "regularized," and well-structured counsel, many of the questions to
Which scholars, clinicians, litigators, and courts devote their time and energy will
have little ultimate impact, and all of the "rights talk" and law reform efforts of
the past two decades will be little more than an illusion. 37 Consider variously these
issues:
• In interpreting substantive civil commitment criteria, establishing the exact
definition of an "overt act" or the "imminence" of danger as a prelude to
involuntary civil commitment. 38
Keri Gould, April26, 1991) (Professor Gould was previously senior attorney for the Mental Hygiene
Legal Service, New York City.) My own experience-three years as a deputy public defender
specializing in trials of mentally disabled defendants and eight years as director of New Jersey's
Division of Mental Health Advocacy-is identical.
34
Hiday, Representing Respondents Under New Civil Commitment Statutes: An Analysis of Counsel's Role In and Out of the Courtroom, 5 Law & Pol'y Q. 438,452 (1983). This conclusion depends
on another assumption: that the trial judge is even aware that organized counsel is available to
represent the individual facing commitment. See In reCommitment ofC.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (trial court apparently unaware of existence of state-funded Mental Health
Advocacy Service).
•
35
Compare e.g., Task Panel Report, supra note 13, at 59, to see 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.11, at
786 n. 216 (critiquing earlier private bar efforts).
36
Such lawyers have frequently played important lead roles in many of the most important mental
disability law reform cases litigated over the past two decades, and, in a few instances, have devoted
their private practice nearly exclusively to such work. See e.g. , S. S. Herr, The New Clients: Legal
Services for Mentally Retarded Persons 64 n. 239 (1979); Schwartz, Fleischner, Schmidt, Gates,
Costanzo, & Winkelman, Protecting the Rights and Enhancing the Dignity of People With Mental
Disabilities: Standards for Effective Legal Advocacy, 14 Rutgers LJ. 541, 55a-53 (1983); Herr,
supra note 6, at 356.
37
~ee generally, Lottman, Paper Victories, in Paper Victories and Hard Realities: The Implementation of the Legal and Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Disabled 93 (V. Bradley & G. Clarke eds.
38 1976).
Compare e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E. D. Wis. 1972} (commitment must
be premised on a recent "overt act"), to United States ex rei. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707,
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• In applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the procedures employed in
such commitment determinations, deciding whether time limits in commitment certificate applications must be interpreted narrowly or expansively. 39
• In determining the extent of the state's obligation to provide a "right to
training,' ' 40 whether individual clinical and treatment issues are cognizable
at involuntary civil commitment hearings after Youngberg v. Romeo. 41
• In establishing the procedures that must accompany the right to refuse
treatment, considering whether a "judicial officer model" or an "independent evaluator/administrative model" is the most appropriate means of
vindicating the right. 42
• In weighing the interplay between deinstitutionalization and homelessness,
assessing whether a patient's refusal to take medication is a sufficient
predicate upon which to preclude the consideration of outpatient or community treatment. 43
• In considering the implication of mental disability for the trial of criminal
cases, such issues as the length of time that an indictment can be kept open
against a defendant found incompetent to stand trial in accordance with
Jackson v. Indiana, 44 the appropriateness of retaining the "volitional"
prong of the insanity defense in a post-Hinckley universe, 45 the applicability of Ake v. Oklahoma46 in non-insanity defense cases,47 or the assessment
of competency in determining whether a death row prisoner· may be executed.48

712 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (rejecting the " overt act" requirement), and see id. at 711 (defining "overt
act"); see generally, I M. Perlin, supra note 5, §2.13. On the question of "imminence" of harm, see
In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P. 2d 109, 112-13 (1982) (collecting cases).
39
Compare e.g., State ex rei. Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 446 N.E. 2d 1387 (1983) (strict
interpretation), to Matter of Z.O., 197 N.J. Super. 330, 484 A. 2d 1287 (App. Div. 1984) (broad
interpretation). ·
40
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 407 U.S. 307 (1982).
41
Compare Matter of Commitment of J.L.J., 210 N.J. Super. I, 509 A. 2d 184, 186 (App. Div. 1985)
(issue cognizable), to In re Harhut, 367 N.W. 2d 628,632 (Minn. Ct. App_. 1985) (issue generally not
cognizable).
42
Compare Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485,495 N.E. 2d"337, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986) Gudicial model),
to Rennie v. Klein, Civil Action No. 77-2624 (D. N.J., Aug. 16, 1984) (consent order), reprinted in
2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §5.37 (administrative model).
43
See In re J.B., 217 Mont. 504,705 P. 2d 598,602 (1985); on this question generally, see Perlin, supra
note 10, at 123.
44
406 u.s. 715 (1972).
45
See generally, Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 Case West. Res. L. Rev. 599 (1989-90).
46
470 U.S. 68 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
47
See e.g., Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W. 2d 809,814-15 (N.D. 1985) (civil commitment case); In re
Brown, 1986 WL 13385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986), at 5 (child custody); Matter of Sanders, 108 N .M. 434,
439, 773 P. 2d 1241, 1246 (Ct. App. 1989) (treatment guardianship revocation).
48
See e.g., Heilbrun, Treatment of Competency for Execution: An Overview, 5 Behav. Sci. & L. 383
(1987).
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If adequate counsel is not available to represent the mentally disabled individuals in respect to these issues, then the legal disposition ofthese difficult cases
will have little ultimate impact on the way that the mental disability and justice
systems interact. Quality ,counsel provides the most likely way-perhaps the only
likely way-to ensure the effectuation of dignity values in all of these cases.
Without implementation and vindication of this right, the entire enterprise of
"mental disability law" is in danger of remaining little more than an intellectually
interesting but substantively meaningless parlor game. "Progress"-as measured
by case law development and statutory reform-will be, at best, self-limiting, and,
at worst, regressive.

B. Significance of Counsel
In order for players in the mental disability/justice system to effectuate any
meaningful change on behalf of mentally disabled persons, it is necessary to focus
on the critical role of counsel for a series of overlapping and interrelated reasons.
1. Rights Are Not Self-Executing

Legal rights are not necessarily self-executing. 49 The declaration by a court of
a right "to" a service or a right to be free " from" an intrusion does not in se
provide that service or guarantee freedom from intrusion. A right is only a paper
declaration without an accompanying remedy, 50 and, without counsel (so as to
best guarantee enforcement), there is little chance that the rights "victories" that
have been won in test case and Jaw reform litigation in this area will have any
impact on the-mentally disabled population. 51
Three examples should suffice. In 1972, the Supreme Court decided in Jackson v. Indiana 52 that it violates due process to commit an individual awaiting
criminal trial for more than the "reasonable period of time" needed to determine
49

50

51

Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 921, 941 (1985). S ee also,
e.g., Harvey v. State, 774 P. 2d 87,98 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting The Douglas Letters: Selections From
the Private Papers of Justice William 0 . Douglas 162 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987) (bill of rights freedoms));
Note, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees Under Attorney Fee Shifting
Statutes, 189 Duke L.J. 438, 465 n. 151, quoting S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News S908 (civil rights laws not self-executing);
People v. Kern, 75 N.Y. 2d 638, 651,555 N.Y.S. 2d 647,653,554 N.E. 2d 1235, 1241 (1990) (same);
State v. Duman, 1990 WL 83986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), at 2 (speedy trial rights).
See generally, Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in
the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J. 665 (1987).
According to Professor Zeigler:
[A) right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish . . . . Unless
a duty can be enforced, it is not really a duty; it is only a voluntary obligation that a
person can fulfill or not at his whim ...
. . . Rights promote well-being in the broadest sense. They secure the dignity and
the integrity of human beings .. . . Rights give people control over their lives and are
essential to self-respect.

52

ld. at 678-79 (footnotes ommitted).
406 u.s. 715 (1972).

48

PERLIN

"whether there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial
in the foreseeab~e future. " 53 Yet, 13 years later, Professor Bruce Winick reported that, in almost half of the states, Jackson had yet to be implemented, and
the pre-Jackson problems (of overlong commitments) "still persist[ed]. " 54 In
another setting, even though the District of Columbia Code contains a provision that patients can invoke seeking either periodic review of their commitment or an independent psychiatric evaluation, evidence developed in a recent
case has revealed that, in the 22 years since the passage of the law in question, not
a single patient had exercised his rights to this statutory review. 55 Similarly,
hard-fought institutional reform "victories" in cases declaring broad rights· to
treatment had little "real world" impact when it became clear that there were no
lawyers available to ensure that the decisions would be properly implemented. 56
Because rights are not self-executing, the need for counsel is thus further magnified.
The early flush of victories in test cases filed on behalf of mentally disabled
individuals-both in procedural and substantive challenges to commitment and
release laws and in wholesale attacks on conditions of institutional confinementmay have lulled observers into thinking, incorrectly, that the main battlefield of
mental disability litigation was the summary judgment motion in the federal dis-

53

/d. at 733 .
Winick, supra note 49, at 940; see also, R. Roesch & S. Golding, Competency to Stand Trial 121-26
(1980); Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, inS. J. Brake!, J . Parry & B. Weiner, The
Mentally Disabled and the Law 693, 704 (3d ed. 1985).
55 Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987); see generally, Perlin, Morality and
Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasohing, and
Cognitive Dissonance, 19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiat. & L. 131, 133 (1991). See also, Wexler, The
Waivability of Recommitment Hearings, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 175, 176-78 (1978) (discussing problems
inherent in patient-initiated review mechanisms).
56
On the · question of compliance with the court's broad staffing orders in the landmark right to
treatment case of Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), affd sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), see generally, Wyatt V.
Stickney: Retrospect and Prospect (L. R. Jones & R. Parlour, eds. 1981); see also, O'Reilly &
Sales, Setting Physical Standards for Mental Hospitals: To Whom Should the Courts Listen? 8 Int'l
J.L. & Psychiat. 301 (1986); O'Reilly & Sales, Privacy for the Institutionalized Mentally ll/: Are
Court-Ordered Standards Effective? II Law & Hum. Behav. 41 (1987). There are many other
related potential examples involving potential collateral actions. Although several cases have vindicated patients' right to vote, see e.g., Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Belchertown, 368
Mass. 631, 334 N .E. 2d 629 (1975); Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J . Super. 439, 354 A. 2d 355 (App. Div.
176), this right becomes an empty shell if, for instance, there is no staff worker available to drive the
patient to a poll. The presence of counsel could ensure vindication of this right, by filing a supplemental action to order the hospital to provide such transportation, compare Reiser v. Prunty, 727
P. 2d 538, 547 (Mont. 1986) (hospital and psychiatrist had no responsibility to protect constitutional
right to vote of patient detained under emergency detention statute). Similarly, a court order mandating the constitutional right to visitation, see e.g., Schmidt v. Schubert, 422 F. Supp. 57, 58 (E.D.
Wis. 1976), becomes meaningless if a hospital announces that it cannot provide adequate staff to
implement such visitation rights. Again, counsel would be needed to ensure that the original plaintiff
have an enforceable remedy. (Personal communication, Dr. Robert L. Sadoff, Feb. 2, 1991.)

54
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trict court. 5 7 Without the constant presence of counsel, victories in cases such as
these remain in danger of deteriorating into "paper victories. " 58
2. The Myth of Adequate Counsel

Also, it has been supposed for over a decade that counsel is regularly available to mentally disabled persons in individual matters involving their comm~t
ment to, retention in, and release from psychiatric hospitals. 59 As previously
discussed, 60 this a~ailability is largely illusory. Further, such representation is
rarely available in a systemic way in law reform or test cases and is rarely provided in any systemic way in cases that involve counseling or negotiating short of
actual litigation. 61
Empirical surveys are consistent. The quality of counsel remains the single
most important factor in the disposition of cases in involuntary civil commitment
systems and in the trial of mentally disabled criminal defendants. 62 It is only when
counsel is provided in an organized, specialized, and regularized way that there is

57

This thesis is discussed carefully and comprehensively in its historical perspective in Wexler,
Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, this issue, 16 Law &
Hum. Behav. 27-38 (1991).
58
See, for the classic inquiry, Lottman, supra note 37.
59
See e.g. , Stone, supra note 2, at 821-22 (charging that a " one-sided advocacy system" exists in
which patients are regularly represented by zealous and conscientious lawyers); see also, e.g.,
French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affd o.b. 443 U.S. 901 (1979)
(rejecting plaintiff's assumption that lawyer in involuntary civil commitment case will not act in
· client's best interest). It should be self-evident that we cannot assume adequacy of counsel from the
mere fact that a " warm body" stands next to the person in court who faces involuntary commitment. This discussion may appear to assume another fact that it perhaps not in evidence: That
patients actually receive adequate treatment at such hospitals so as to lessen or ameliorate their
mental illness. For an analysis of our assumption of treatment staff competency in this regard, and
its implications for deinstitutionalization policies, see Perlin, supra note 9, at 124-25.
60
See supra text accompanying notes 19-28.'
61
See e.g ., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (counsel not required in
hearing held to determine whether prison inmate should be transferred to state psychiatric hospital);
Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1044 (1990) (counsel not required in hearing held to
determine whether prisoner has right to refuse involuntary imposition of psychotropic medication).
Statistics compiled by the National Institute of Mental Health regarding the provision of counsel by
P&A systems to institutionalized individuals suggest that class-action-type cases were instituted in
fewer than half of all jurisdictions in fiscal year 1989. Although the same statistics show that 91 class
· actions were "initiated" during that time period, 46 of these are attributed to only two states. This
statistical anomaly is perhaps best explained by variance in means of data collection; in those
jurisdictions, the "initiation" of a class action apparently referred to the provision of any sort of
counseling or advocacy service to more than one client on any question of legal rights. National
Institute of Mental Health, FY 1989 Report on Activities Under PL 99-319, the Protection and
Advocacy
For Mentally II/ Individuals Act 61 , Table 9 (1990) (P&A Report).
62
See 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.02, 11t 744. Beyond the scope of this paper is the important question of the implications of lawyers' imposition of their own political or social goals and ideologies on
their clients. For an important perspective on this question in this context, see Herr, supra note 6,
at 357.
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more than a random chance of lasting, systemic change. Yet, few states appear
willing to provide such counsel in such a manner. 63
A contrast between the development of case law in Virginia and Minnesota is
especially instructive. Notwithstanding the fact that Virginia is approximately
15% more populated than Minnesota,64 in the decade from 1976 to 1986, there
were only two published litigated civil cases in Virginia involving questions of
mental hospitalization, while in Minnesota during the same period of time, there
were at least 101 such cases. 65 Virginia has no tradition of providing vigorous
counsel to the mentally disabled, 66 whereas Minnesota does make such provision.67
63

See generally, id. §8.08. Beyond the scope of this paper is a detailed investigation of the specific
ethical issues that must be considered in this context. For discussions of this question, see e.g. ,
Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19; 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §§8.2a-8.23. Also beyond the scope of this
article is a consideration of other economically based issues. Most persons facing involuntary civil
commitment are indigent, and any assessment of counsel must weigh this factor as well. See e.g. ,
Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren Burger's
"Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry
& L. 149, 157, 163 n. 72 (1981) (210 of213 juveniles facing civil commitment in sample studied were
indigent). On the special issues affecting lawyers in. the representation of the poor in general, see
Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc'l Change 659 (1987-88).
64 According to the 1988 census, Virginia's population was 6,015,000, while Minnesota's was
4,307,000.
65 Keilitz, Casey, & Keilitz, A Study of the Emergency Mental Health Services and Involuntary Civil
Commitment Practices in Virginia 47 (1989). Though Minnesota court rules command patients'
counsel to "advocate vigorously" on behalf of their clients, see Minn. R. Commitment, Rule 1.01
(1990), there is no comparable provision in Virginia law; cf Va. Stat. §19.2-169.5 (199o) (role of
counsel in raising insanity in criminal proceedings).
66
See Keilitz, Casey & Keilitz, supra note 65, at 39-45, and especially at 42 ("Given the absence of
a district attorney representing the Commonwealth, or an attorney representing the petitioner,
commitment proceedings are at best, quasi-adversarial" ). For an analysis of locality-by-locality
involuntary civil commitment practice in Virginia, see Bodman, The Nether World of Involuntary
Commitment, Wash. Post (Jan. 8, 1984). At the time that Boden wrote, lawyers in Virginia were paid
$25 for preliminary hearings and another $25 for a final hearing.
67
Under Minn. R. Commitment, Comment to Rule I (1990):
A. All proceedings under the [Act] are adversarial. Minimum adversary representation ordinarily includes, but is not limited to:
I. being familiar with statute and case law and court rules which govern commitment proceedings; and
2. interviewing respondent no later than 24 hours after confinement . . . ; and
3. reviewing respondent's medical records ... early enough to insure sufficient
time to investigate and secure additional medical evaluations, and/or prepare
for the hearings; and
4. contacting or interviewing all persons whose testimony might tend to support
respondent's position and subpoenaing witnesses if necessary; and,
5. investigating alternatives less restrictive than those sought in the petition; and
6. attempting to interview prior to the hearing any persons who might testify for
the petitioner at the hearing; and
7. informing respondent of the latter's rights, including the right to appeal.
B. [This rule] is intended to insure that once appointed, the same lawyer will continue to represent respondent. . . .
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The existence of this sort of disparity is especially disturbing in light of the
detailed empirical database that has been developed by staff members of the
National Center for State Courts and their colleagues, studying the provision of
counsel in selected jurisdictions,68 as well as the comprehensive and thoughtful
Commitment Guidelines. 69 These reports and Guidelines-well documented in
law reviews and in behavioral journals--could serve as a blueprint for national
models of counsel provision. 70 Yet, only one of the citations to these recommendations mentions the counsel provisions;71 similarly, the extent to which these

According to Professor Eric Janus, this court rule grew out of a study commissioned by the
Minnesota Supreme Court on the involuntary civil commitment process and followed settlement of
a suit that had sought to force Hennepin County to provide an independent panel of trained counsel
to represent individuals at such hearings. Janus, now a professor at William Mitchell Law School,
was formerly a litigator with the Minneapolis Legal Aid office that provided representation to
mentally disabled persons. (Personal Communications, Professor Eric Janus, February I, 1991 &
March 13 1991.)
68
See e.g. , Fitch, Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disabled: Implementation of the Law in
Winston-Salem , North Carolina, 14 N.C. Cent. L.J. 406 (1984); Keilitz, Conn & Giampetro, Least
Restrictive Treatment ofInvoluntary Patients: Translating Concepts Into Practice, 29 ST. L.U.L.J.
691 (1985); Keilitz, Fitch & McGraw, A Study of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Los Angeles
County, 14 Sw. U.L. Rev. 238 (1984); Keilitz & McGraw, The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine in Los Angeles County Civil Commitment, 6 Whittier L. Rev. 35 (1984); Keilitz & Roach, A
Study of Defense Counsel and the Involuntary Civil Commitment System in Columbus, Ohio, 13
Cap. U.L. Rev. 175 (1983); McGraw, Fitch, Buckley & Marvell, Civil Commitment in New York
City: An Analysis of Practice, 5 Pace L. Rev. 259 (1985); Van Duizend & Zimmerman, The Involuntary Civil Commitment Process in Chicago: Practices and Procedures, 33 DePaul L. Rev. 225
(1984).
69
See National Center For State Courts, Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment (1986) (Guidelines). These Guidelines are considered carefully in Keilitz, NCSC Guidelines for Involuntary Civil
Commitment: A Workable Framework for Justice in Practice, 39 Hosp. & Commun. Psychiat. 398
(1988); Wexler, Reforming the Law in Action Through Empirically Grounded Civil Commitment
Guidelines, 39 Hosp. & Commun. Psychiat. 402 (1988); Appelbaum & Roth, Assessing the NCSC
Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment From the Clinician's Point of View, 39 Hosp. &
Commun. Psychiat. 406 (1988).
70s
ee e.g., Guidelines, supra note 69, at 44-47 (ensuring effective advocacy for patients' roles and
duties of patients' counsel), and id. at sa-56 (means of appointing patients' counsel; prehearing
duties of patients' counsel); see also, L. Arthur, S. Haimowitz & R. Lockwood, Involuntary Civil
Commitment: A Manual for Lawyers and Judges 9-14 (1988) (role of counsel; means of compen71 sation), discussing Guidelines, supra note 69.
~ee Matter of Stokes, 546 A. 2d 356, 361 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988) (patient's counsel can play an
Important role in determining disposition alternatives), citing Guidelines, supra note 69.
For other references to the Guidelines, see In re Melton, 565 A. 2d 635, 646 (D.C. Ct. App.
1989), vacated 1990 WL 175025 (D.C. Ct. App., Nov. 7, 1990) (need for fact testimony at civil
commitment hearing); K.C. v. State, 771 P. 2d 774, 777 (Wyo. 1989) (scope of appeal from civil
c~mmitment order); Stokes, 546 A. 2d at 361 nn. 6, 10 (least restrictive alternative requirement);
Riese v. St. Mary' s Hospital and Medical Center, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 209
0987), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P. 2d 698 (1989) (refusal
of medication).
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recommendations have had a significant impact on subsequent statutory developments is not clear. 72
3. Counsel's Educative Function
The presence of structured counsel-of lawyers supported by mental health
professionals-also serves an important internal educative function by making it
more likely that all participants in the mental disability .trial process-including
judges-are sensitized to the social, cultural, and political issues that are involved
in providing representation to such a marginalized class. 73 The disappointing results reported over a decade ago by Dr. Normal Poythress (that merely training
lawyers about psychiatric techniques and psychological nomenclature made little
difference in ultimate case outcome74) tell us that education about the law and
about the clinical details of mental illness are not enough; counsel must be attitudinally and ethically75 educated if they are to provide truly adequate representational services.
The perfunctory performance of counsel in the areas discussed in this article
(where mental disability issues are central) contrasts sharply with lawyers' traditional zealousness in the representation of similarly disabled clients in civil law
areas such as testamentary capacity, traumatic injury, or competency to make
business decisions, where mental health issues are collateral. 76 The converse is
also true: Even though mental disability professiona~s rarely complain about exhaustive or intensive cross-examination in the latter group of cases, "they are
often indignant when challenged by an attorney representing a patient in the
commitment process. " 77
12

Though there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Guidelines served as a blueprint for
statutory reform, there is no formal supporting written attribution (personal communication, Dr.
lngo Keilitz, February 6, 1991).
73
See generally, Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 168-73; 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §§8.21-8.22.
74
Poythress concluded that the "trained" lawyers' court behavior did not differ materially from that
of "untrained" lawyers because the trained lawyers' attitudes toward their clients did not change,
and such lawyers were not deterred from taking the "traditional, passive, paternal stance" towards
their clients. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope
With Expert Testimony, 2 Law & Hum. Behav. I, 15 (1978). A representative trainee told Poythress:
"I really enjoyed your workshop, and I've been reading over your materials and its [sic] all very
interesting, but this is the real world, and we've got to do something with these people. They' re
sick." Jd.
" See D. Wexler, Mental Health Law Ill n. 55 (1981); see generally, Note. The Role of Counsel in
the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 Yale L.J. 1540 (1975). On the additional lawyering roles that counsel for the mentally disabled person must fill, see 2 M. L. Perlin,
supra note 5, §8.21, at 807-17.
76
See 2 M. Perlin, supra 5, §8.20, at 805.
77
Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 165. At least one prominent forensic psychiatrist attributed such
reluctance to exposure in an arena where the witness does not retain final authority as "professional
narcissism." McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for trial and Mental Illness, 49
B.U. L. Rev. 46 (1%9).
Similarly, it has been observed that, while the states can generally provide "a very thorough
examination" of a criminal defendant raising insanity as a plea to a murder indictment, such
thoroughness is frequently sorely lacking in psychiatric status examinations that precede civil
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4. Implementation of Collateral Rights

Further, if counsel is not adequate, then it is unlikely that counsel will seek
vigorous execution or implementation of other collateral rights. In Ake v. Oklahoma, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that if a criminal defendant
made a threshold ex parte showing that his sanity at the time of the offense was
likely to be a "significant factor". at trial, he was constitutionally entitled to
state-provided psychiatric assistance on this issue. 78 In the subsequent 6 years,
Ake has been read narrowly and with little creativity79 ; as a result, the rationale
of Justice Marshall's opinion-that psychiatrists will be able to assist lay jurors
"to mak'e a sensible and educated determination" about the defendant's medical
condition at the time of the offense" 80-has rarely been complied with. If mentally
disabled litigants81 were afforded more adequate counsel, it is likely that Ake
would have been implemented in a manner more in accordance with the spirit of
the Supreme Court's decision.82
5. Underidentification of Mental Disability Cases

The problems in question are even further magnified where cases are not
specifically identified as "mental disability cases" (e.g., a criminal trial where a
mental status defense falls short of the invocation of the insanity plea; a . child
custody battle where parents' mental illness-but not their incompetenc'y- is at
issue, and where the court may not " see" the mental disability implications). 83
The problems caused by this judicial myopia are even more alarming in light of the
predictable aftermath ofthe Supreme Court's sterile and perfunctory adequacy of
counsel standard set up in Strickland v. Washington 84 : Most courts adhere to a
minimalist reading of Strickland, 85 resulting in a situation where Judge Bazelon's
commitment. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1004 n. 22 (E.D. Wis. 1972), quoting testimony
by Dr. David J. Vail, former medical director of the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare.
78
470 u.s. 68, 74 (1985).
79
See generally, 3M. Perlin, supra note 5, §17.17, at 550-52, and id. at 157-58 (1991 pocket part)
(citing cases).
80
Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
81
See supra note 47 (citing the few cases in which Ake has been considered in a civil context).
82
On the implementation of Ake in general, see Casey & Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health
Expert Assistance Provided to Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization, Administration, and
Fiscal Management, 34 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 19 (1989). On the related ethical implications of Ake,
see Appelbaum, In the Wake of Ake: The Ethics of Expert Testimony in an Advocate's World, 15
Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 15 (1987); Rachlin, From Impartial Expert to Adversary in the
Wake of Ake, 16 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 25 (1985).
83
See e.g., Easing the Trials of Trial-Disabled Defendants: Competency Assistance Topic of New
NCSC Study, NCSC Report, Vol. 15, #7 (July 1988), at 1,3.
84
466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, there is no constitutional violation if counsel provides
"reasonably effective assistance" to be measured objectively by "prevailing professional norms."
Id. at 687-88; see generally, Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant,
Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in
Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3 N.Y.L. Sch. Hum. Rts. Ann. 91 (1985) (discussing Strickland in this
context).
8
' See cases cited in 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.30, at 845 n. 617, and id. at 132 (1991 pocket part).
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worst fantasy-of assigned counsel who are little more than "walking violations
of the Sixth Amendment" 86-has come true. Since such poor representation is
countenanced in criminal cases involving mental status defenses (even in death
penalty cases),87 there is no realistic chance of expecting serious scrutiny in civil
cases. 88
. 6. The Limited Role of P&A's

While the passage of the P&A Act89 has resulted in the provision of "needed
rights enforcement services" for certain mentally disabled persons,90 this "legislation is not a panacea for the underlying problems. Although the act is a major
positive step in the right direction,91 the P&A statute is not a palliative for all of
the counsel adequacy problems discussed in this paper.
The legislative history of the Act specifies that it was not Congress's intention
to authorize P&As to regularly provide assistance at commitment hearings. 92 The
Act was conceived of as a mechanism to prevent institutional neglect and abuse,
and P&A programs are neither able nor expected to redress all commitment
issues. 93 Further, NIMH policy directives stipulate that P&A money should gen-

86

Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. I, 2 (1973), as quoted in Brown
v. McGarr, 774 F . 2d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 1985).
87
For a particularly shocking example, see Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of grant of certiorari), discussed in 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.30, at 848 n.
637. For an excellent overview of all issues, see Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense
Counsel: The Impact of Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 2_9 B.C. L. Rev. 531
(1988).
88 Since Strickland, only a handful of cases have considered effectiveness of counsel standards in the
context of civil commitment cases. See e.g., Jones v. State, 477 N.E. 2d 353, 357-59 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (rejecting civil patient's Strickland challenge); In re Dibley, 400 N.W. 2d 186 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (rejecting similar ineffectiveness claim on grounds of no prejudice; Strickland not cited);
compare Matter of Pima Cty. Mental Health Serv., 157 Ariz. 314, 757 P. 2d 118 (Ct. App. 1988)
(allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at commitment hearing required evidentiary hearing).
I consider the implications of Strickland for mentally disabled persons in danger of becoming
homeless in Perlin, supra note 9, at 126-27.
89 See 42 U.S.C. §§10801 et seq. (Supp. 1988); see generally, Harvey & Decker, Protection & Advocacy for Persons With Mental Illness: A Resource for Rights Enforcement, 14 Law & Psychology.
Rev. 211 (1990); 2M. Perlin, supra note 13, §8.16.
90 Harvey & Decker, supra note 89, at 220.
91 See 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, Comment to §8.16, at 799-800 (P&A expansion "will inevitably have
a significant effect on the quality and quantity of advocacy services" made available to institutionalized mentally disabled persons) (emphasis in original). Compare Sen. Rep. No .. 99-109, reprinted
in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 361, 1375 (P&A Act will "ensur[e] protective rights to all
mentally ill persons residing in institutions throughout this country" (additional view by Senator
Kerry et a/.) (emphasis added).
92
Report to Accompany S. 2392, Senate Committee on Labor & Human Resources, S. Rpt. No.
100-454 (August 1988), at 7. When not used to describe the congressional act, the adjective "P&A"
refers to programs and offices established under the Act.
93
(Personal communication, Natalie Reatig, Director, Protection and Advocacy Program, Division of
Education and Service Systems Liaison, NIMH, February 8, 1991).
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erally not be used for civil commitment hearings, as this is considered a state
function that should not be supplanted by the federally funded program. 94
Also, each state is free to establish its own priorities, within the constraints
of the federal statute and policy guidelines, in determining substantive areas of
service provision concentration. 95 Some jurisdictions receive only modest funding
under the Act. 96 Finally, recent P&A statistics reflect the tiny percentage of P&A
resources that go to litigation in contested cases; moreover, the litigation done by
P&A offices is not evenly proportioned acrossjurisdictions. 97 In short, the P&As
cannot be relied u'J>on to solve the underlying problems.
7. The Increased Complexity of Mental Disability Law

The need for counsel has also increased as the substance of mental disability
law has become more complicated. 98 The retrenchment in the federal courts that
has resulted in a judiciary that is far more hostile to all sorts of civil rights claims99
has forced litigators seeking to establish new rights to look to other forums: to
administrative arenas and to state courts (arguing under state constitutions). 100 As
94

The NIMH Protection and Advocacy Program: Evolving Policy Guidelines 5 (January I, 1991), and
see id. (listing limited situations in which P&As can represent individuals at commitment hearings);
see also, 42 U.S.C. §10821(1) (Supp. 1988) ("non·supplanting" provision ofP&A Act).
95
See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §10805(a)(6) (role of Advisory Council in priority setting); id. §10805(c)(I)(A),
§10805(c)(2)(B) (role of governing authority in setting-priorities with Advisory Council).
96
Several states received only a minimum allotment of $152,000 in fiscal year 1989 for all P&A
services for mentally ill clients. See P&A Report, supra note 61, at 3.
97
See Harvey & Decker, supra note 89, at 218 (in fiscal year 1988, only I& of all client problems
- resulted in actual litigation). This statistic, of course, is susceptible to multiple interpretations; it
may be that it also reflects P&A programs' success in resolving disputes without the need for
litigation.
On the lack of proportionality in litigation, see P&A Report, supra note 61, at 59-60, Table 8.
A sutdy of the P&A statistics also suggests that litigation is generally more likely to occur in those
states where vigorous mental disability advocacy programs predated P&A passage; e.g., New York,
New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts. For a state-by-state analysis of the different ways counsel had
been provided to mentally disabled individuals prior to the P&A Act, see American Bar Ass'n,
Comm'n on the Mentally Disabled, Mental Health Advocacy Services Report: Final (undated).
98
Recently enacted federal statutes now provide new substantive rights for the mentally disabled to
be free from discrimination, in matters of housing, employment, and access to health services and
entitlements. See e.g., P.L. 101-366, 104 Stat. 327 (Americans With Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C.
§3602 (1990) (Fair Housing Act Amendments)). Without the presence of adequate counsel, these
statues may perpetuate the illusion that the mentally disabled have certain substantive rights, but
leave them with no means for seeking the effectuation of those rights. See generally, Bellow &
Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice,
58 B.U. L. Rev. 337 (1978). For a related inquiry, see H. D. Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins
and Development of National Policy 63 (1990) (discussing political implications of President
Kennedy's failure to desegregate federally subsidized housing with "a mere presidential pens~roke"); see also id. at 455 (political implications of gap "between agreement with abstract prin99 ctples and steps to implement the principles").
See Perlin, supra note 10, at 136-37.
100
S~e generally, Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally
Dtsabled: The Last Frontier? 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1249 (1987). The significance of the emergence
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a result, mental disability lawyers need to continually exhibit more familiarity
with a far wider variety of substantive and procedural doctrines than they might
have had to master in the mid-1970s (when it appeared that the civil rights of
patients and expatients would continue to expand indefinitely). 101
8. Changes in Social Climate

The external social climate has also changed. Though the public expressed
considerable sympathy to and support of lawyers involved in exposes of "shock
the conscience" facilities in the early 1970s, 102 times have changed. The more
recent combination of (a) financial austerity, (b) years of socially acceptable
mean-spiritedness toward the socially disadvantaged, 103 (c) the collapse of many
supportive social service systems, 104 (d) the "swing of the pendulum" 105 that has
led many states to once again loosen both substantive commitment criteria and
procedural due process protections (resulting in new increases in involuntary
commitment caseloads), 106 and (e) a general weariness with the whole range of
social problems that seemed to flow from the early civil rights movement in this
of. state constitutional remedies in this context of the development of mental disability law is
considered in Wexler, supra note 57.
101
Three examples should be illustrative. For the past several years, the scope of a patient's right to
refuse treatment has developed in significantly different' ways in the state and federal court systems, and it is critical that counsel understand the differences both in doctrine and in the underlying
rationales. See generally, Perlin, Are Courts Competent To Decide Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 957 (1990).
In a completely different context, patients' counsel-traditionally accustomed to filing suits
seeking to vindicate their clients' right to refuse medication-are now structuring litigation, seeking
to vindicate the right to receive certain medications, most notably clozapine. See Edward K. et a/
v. White, Civil Action No. 88-3358 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (seeking Clozaril treatment for all class members residing at Pennsylvania state psychiatric hospital) (plaintiffs represented by Disabilities Law
Project); see generally, Winslow, Courts Consider Schizophrenia Drug's Access, Wall. St. J., Oct.
5, 1990, at Bl (discussing Clozarillitigation); on the advocacy issues, seeP. Margulies, "A Case
Study of the Cognitive Psychology of Law Reform: Mental Health Advocates' Ambiyalence About
New Schizophrenia Medication," (paper delivered at the Association of American Law School's
Section on Law and Mental Disability's annual meeting, Washington, DC, January 1991); see also,
23 States File Antitrust Suit Against Sandoz, Psychiat. News (Jan. 18, 1991), at I, 6-7. Finally, the
conflict between the implementation of the least restrictive alternative and the imposition of tort
liability for premature releases from inpatient facilities has caused advocates to weigh the question
of whether courts should be involved in release decision making in all cases of patients involuntarily committed following a finding of dangerousness to others. See Perlin, supra note 10, at 126
n. 380 (discussing debate held at annual American Academy of Psychiatry and Law Conference,
October 1990, on this issue).
102
See I M. Perlin, supra note 5, § 1.03, at 7--8 (discussing public awareness of institutional conditions .
as an animating force in the growth of mental disability law).
103
Perlin, supra note 10, at ~7.
104
/d. at 74-80.
105
The pendulum metaphor is employed, inter alia, in Durham & LaFond, supra note 30, at 398;
Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally 1/1: A System in Need of Change, 29 Viii. L.
Rev. 367, 379 (1983--84); Shuman, Innovative Statutory Approaches to Civil Commitment: An
Overview and Critique, 13 Law, Med. & Health Care 284, 286 (1985).
106
See e.g., Durham & LaFond, supra note 30, at 444.

ROLE OF COUNSEL .

57

area (focusing on the perceived linkage between deinstitutionalization and homelessness), 107 has created a new climate where patients' rights lawyers are seen as
"the enemy." 108 Professor Jan Costello's anecdotal discussion of the paradigmatic cocktail party-at which she, as a former patients' rights lawyer, is blamed
by other partygoers as the primary cause of homelessness 109-reflects this change
in political and social climate. In short, mental disability lawyers are working in a
more hostile and coercive environment, an environment that definitionally heightens the demand for a cadre of well-trained and sensitive counsel to provide representation to the population in question. 110
9. Other Moral, Social, and Political Issues

Adequate counsel is also needed to deal with other collateral moral, social,
and political issues that, to an important degree, affect legal and public decision
making in this area. 111 If such issues as the "dilemma of the moral clinician," 112
the impact of pretextuality on the mental disability trial process, 113 the way that
the use of "ordinary common sense" drives decision making by judges and jurors
alike in such cases, 114 and the pervasiveness of heuristic biases in such decision
making, 115 are not confronted by counsel, it is likely that the pervasive cognitive
and behavioral biases that infect decision making in this area will continue unnoticed and unabated. Finally, the recent interest demonstrated by scholars in "ther107

Perlin, supra note 10, at 93-107.
See e.g., E. F. Torrey, supra note 4, at 156-59; see also, Lambert, Psychologists Back Koch Policy
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apeutic jurisprudence" should force all participants in the system to begin to
critically weight the therapeutic (or antitherapeutic) effect of the mental disability
system. 116 Here, adequate counsel is needed to ensure consideration of the therapeutic potential inherent in mental disability litigation. It is not enough for a
lawyer to simply argue that the Fourteenth Amendment demands a due process
hearing prior to involuntary commitment; she also needs to have read, studied,
and weighed the implications of Ensminger and Liguori's article raising the possibility that the civil commitment hearing has a distinct, but unexplored, therapeutic potential. 117
In summary, the roles of counsel in the representation of the mentally disabled are multitextured and continually evolving. It is critical for systemic decision makers to acknowledge these roles, the historic shortcomings of sporadic
counsel serving the population in question, and ways of attempting to solve some
of the underlying problems.

III. CONCLUSION
I suggest the following recommendations as a modest means of beginning to
come to grips with the issues discussed above:
I. Each jurisdiction should study carefully the way counsel is assigned, the
quality of counsel, and the impact of counsel on the operation of the mental
disability law system. This investigation should include such issues as when counsel is assigned, the availability of counsel for appellate review, who pays for
counsel, and who selects those eligible to provide counsel. As part of this inquiry,
the National Center for State Courts' Guidelines for Involuntary Commitment
should be closely studied.
2. Each jurisdiction should make progress toward providing adequate, regularized, structured counsel to all mentally disabled individuals (and should carefully assess the way that counsel is provided to represent the hospital or state
agency that generally take opposing positions). Training should be made available
for all participants in the judicial decision-making system (including patients'
counsel, hospital counsel, court administrators, and judges), and lists of trained
lawyers should be maintained in eachjurisdiction. 118 Also, cooperative continuing
education programs should be instituted for mental disability professionals to
sensitize them to the legal issues involved.
3. Scholars should add this issue to their research agenda 119 and should
116

See Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent (D. Wexler ed. 1990); Wexler,
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118
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119
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consider new ways of assessing the quality of counsel and its impact on both the
trial of cases involviqg the mentally disabled and the ultimate outcomes to the
mentally disabled.
4. Litigators should carefully assess the way that Supreme Court cases like
Strickland and Ake affect the role of counsel and should work on new and creative
strategies (using forums other than federal court, if necessary) to best try to
ensure that adequate counsel is made available to all mentally disabled litigants. 120
5. Behavioral researchers should look critically at allegations that seek to
scapegoat patients' rights lawyers as the true villains in the social drama being
staged and try to evaluate the extent, if any, to which these charges have merit.
6. Law schools should devote more time, resources, and commitment both
to the study of mental disability law as an academic discipline and to the special
skills and "lawyering" issues involved in the representation of mentally disabled
Persons through specialized clinics and training programs.
Although this short list is far from a panacea, at the least it should force
Participants in the system to critically rethink their often-faulty assumptions about
counsel and its provision in litigation involving mentally handicapped individuals.
If that were to happen, then perhaps this area of the law would no longer be, in
Appelbaum's poignant phrase, the "disfavored stepchild" of the legal process. 121 .
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